Ric Blumhardt and Allan Isbell Achieve Another Appellate Victory in Gundogdu v. King Mai, Inc.

 The Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District, Division Three, recently published its decision in Gundogdu v. King Mai, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 310. King Mai, Inc. was represented on appeal by Archer Norris's Ric Blumhardt and Allan Isbell and Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP's Ron U. Lunski. Together, they successfully convinced the Court of Appeal to affirm summary judgment for King Mai, Inc. on the grounds that the Gundogdus’ claims were barred by the ten-year statute of limitation in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15 as applied to a claim for defective construction of residential property.

In 1995, King Mai constructed a home, which it sold to the Gundogdus in 1997, sixteen months after completion of construction. The Gundogdus subsequently brought an action against King Mai for negligence and breach of implied warranty arising from alleged defects in the home’s original construction. The action was brought more than ten years after construction of the home, but less than ten years after it was sold to the Gundogdus by King Mai. King Mai successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Gundogdus’ action was completely barred by section 337.15. 

On appeal, the Gundogdus argued that the ten-year statute of limitation had been equitably tolled pursuant to section 337.15, subdivision (e), during the sixteen-month period of King Mai’s passive ownership of the property and completion of construction.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, observing that the defects the Gundogdus claimed to have caused their damages were defects that occurred during the construction of the building; not during King Mai’s passive ownership of it. To interpret section 337.15(e) as tolling the ten-year statute under such circumstances would be to circumvent the very protection that the statute of limitation was designed to avoid – a contractor’s indefinite exposure to liability for its work. Because the Gundogdus’ complaint was necessarily premised on King Mai’s liability as the developer of the property – and not as its owner – there was no reason to apply the exception to the ten-year statute in subdivision (e).

The Gondogdus also asserted that King Mai was equitably estopped from asserting the ten-year statute pursuant to Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363. The Gundogdus argued that King Mai falsely promised to make repairs to the property, on which promise the Gundogdus relied in delaying the filing of their complaint for damages. However, the Court of Appeal observed that the Gundogdus acknowledged on summary judgment that they were aware of defects in the home by February 11, 2004 at the latest, at which time King Mai unequivocally informed the Gundogdus it would make no further repairs to the property. The limitations period did not expire until November of 2005, and the Gundogdus failed to file their suit until April of 2006. Thus, the Gundogdus were precluded as a matter of law from arguing that they proceeded diligently once the truth of the condition of their property was discovered, as necessary to sustain a claim of equitable estoppel.

Through its analysis, the Court of Appeal underscored the different protections afforded to contractors and owners under section 337.15 as a consequence of each entity’s distinct liabilities with respect to property. It also provides valuable guidance to trial and appellate courts on the importance of the distinction between liabilities for defects arising in the course of construction and those arising after completion.

Exploring The Decision To Retain an Appellate Lawyer

Greg May, over at the California Blog of Appeal, is starting a new series on the reasons why attorneys, and more importantly their clients, are sometimes reluctant to hire appellate counsel.  Sure to spark an interesting conversation . . . check it out here.

Did We Win? Fourth District Remands Case For Rehearing on Damages Following A Confusing Special Verdict.

Ever find yourself questioning a victory as the verdict is read?

In Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone, Inc., Case no. D049563 (4th Dist. Mar. 10, 2008), the Fourth District remanded a case for a rehearing on damages finding that the jury’s verdict was hopelessly ambiguous and refusing to choose between two internally inconsistent verdicts. 

Zagami sued James A. Crone, Inc. seeking compensation after equipment disappeared following delivery.  Zagami claimed an agent of Crone signed for receipt of the equipment upon delivery.  Crone argued it never received the equipment and were therefore not liable for its disappearance.

The special verdict form requested damages on (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) good and services rendered; and (4) an open book accounting. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $15,500 on issues 1, 2, and 4.  On the value of goods and services rendered, however, the jury found that the lost equipment was worth $30,000.

The attorneys made a tactical decision in not asking for clarification of the verdict from the jury.  Instead, they argued before the trial court as to which amount --  $15,500 or $30,000 – was the proper judgment.  The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $15,500.  Plaintiff appealed.

The Fourth District reiterated that, on appeal, the correctness of the trial court’s interpretation of a special verdict is reviewed de novo.  There can be no inference in favor of the prevailing party and there is no preference for upholding a special verdict where the confusion is caused by two questions within that verdict.  Nor can the court choose between inconsistent answers.  Therefore, unless the court of appeal can interpret the verdict intended by the jury from its language in light of the pleadings and evidence, the case will be reversed and remanded for another trial on the issue of damages – which is exactly what they did here.


Using Motion Practice to Get Rid of A "Slubby Mass" of Words

While most attorneys strive to write well-argued briefs on substantially justified legal theories (yes, I am an optimist), I don’t believe even the most conscientious of us realized that years ago, the Ninth Circuit created the “Slubby Mass” rule regarding the filings of appellate briefs:

"In order to give fair consideration to those who call upon us for justice, we must insist that parties do not clog the system by presenting us with a slubby mass of words rather than a true brief."  N/S Corp v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (9th. Cir 1997) 127 F.3d 1145, 1146. (Emphasis added.)

Have Opinion Will Travel does a great job of summarizing this esteemed line of jurisprudence here, and bears no repeating. However, the First District has apparently adopted the Ninth Circuit’s impatience with frivolous appeals.

On Friday, the First District ruled that appellant’s arguments in Gong v. Kwong (2007) were in bad-faith and frivolous.(.pdf) The court dismissed the appeal outright and ordered sanctions in favor of both the respondent and the clerk of the court to the tune of $21,000 to be paid jointly by both the appellant and his attorneys. The court was not pleased by appellant’s “creative” arguments to avoid his child support award:

"[They] have taken a phrase or two and have fashioned from them an argument that attempts to subvert the trial court’s intent in order to deny support to Kwong’s children and interest on his obligation his former wife for a nine-month period."

These cases actually highlight an oft overlooked area of appellate practice – the filing of motions at the appellate level. While it in no way compares with motion practice at the trial court level, the procedural rules at the appellate level do offer some opportunities for arguing that a case should be dismissed, or sanctions issued, without necessarily waiting for the entire briefing process to be completed. In certain instances (e.g. when you are facing a “slubby mass”) these motions can be an opportunity to save a client some money, and time, before jumping into the often long briefing process in appellate court.

Why another blog about appellate law?

There are few resources -- either online or in our rapidly diminishing libraries --that offer guidance on protecting your client’s case on appeal while you develop your case at the trial court level. Most practitioners wait until after the trial court has already ruled on a particular issue before evaluating the potential outcome of appellate review of the issue. How the issue is presented to the trial court before it is ruled upon significantly impacts the manner in which the issue is considered by the appellate court. This blog is intended to offer some insight as how to best present such issues at the trial level so that their merits are given maximum consideration at the appellate level.    

When I first began handling appeals, most of the work came from my colleagues at my firm.   I would love to claim that people sought my advice before structuring their litigation, but that rarely happened. Instead, I was the last stop -- often visited by attorneys who weeks before had been riding the high of winning that big verdict only to receive a notice of appeal in their inbox. The reality that the jury verdict or trial court’s decision in their favor was not the end of the dispute would bring them to my door.

Any appellate practitioner will tell you that waiting until after the verdict should not be the first time a litigator considers the potentially appealable issues in a case. By the time the jury renders its verdict, the record and arguments relevant to the issues have been made and your client is bound by both on appeal.

Now at Archer Norris we have an extremely effective collaboration between the trial attorneys and our appellate team. We work together before and during litigation at the trial court level to insure our client’s case is ready for a potential appeal before a notice of appeal is filed. We collaborate on trial strategy at the outset of a case, before summary judgment motions, and in preparing the evidence for trial. Do we write appellate briefs, writ petitions and responses thereto, and appear for oral argument before the various appellate courts? Of course. But the collaboration between our trial counsel and our appellate department protects our clients’ potential for success on appeal. Trial strategy is thorough and well planned, thus eliminating the possibility that an inadequate record or the waiver of a legal argument will diminish our chances on appeal.

What does this have to do with the California Appellate Blog? My colleague, Kim Amick, and I are taking this collaboration “online” as they say. If you are looking for daily case summaries or in-depth analyses of opinions issued on a specific practice area, we will offer that occasionally, but our goal is to highlight those opinions that affect the day-to-day practice of litigators and appellate lawyers. Most importantly, we strive to be a resource for trial and appellate counsel and to foster awareness that the decisions you make from day one affect a potential appeal.

Welcome and enjoy! If you have any questions or comments, Kim and I would be happy to hear from you at rblumhardt@archernorris.com or kamick@archernorris.com.  

Best Regards,

Ric Blumhardt